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A PROXY WAR IN ARABIA: THE DHOFAR INSURGENCY AND CROSS-
BORDER RAIDS INTO SOUTH YEMEN. 
 
 
 
The war in Dhofar, Oman, between 1963 and 1976, which pitted the insurgents of the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Oman (PLFO) against the monarchical regime, has received renewed 
scholarly attention, thanks in part to the declassification of papers from the archives of the 
Sultanate’s principal Western ally, the United Kingdom (UK).1 The fact that the PFLO’s principal 
source of external assistance was the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY, otherwise 
known as South Yemen) is well-established in the historical record,2 whilst in contrast covert 
action conducted by the Omani royal government and its British allies has received scanty 
coverage, aside from a few references in secondary source literature.3 However, declassified 
material from the British government’s archives, notably from the Ministry of Defence (MOD), 
demonstrates that both the UK and Oman raised and trained groups of Mahra tribesmen – exiled 
from the PDRY – to launch cross-border raids into South Yemen between late 1972 and early 
1975.  
 
 Covert action can be defined as clandestine activity conducted by governments to 
influence political, economic and strategic conditions in foreign countries, in which the former’s 
involvement is intended to be both concealed and deniable. Proxy warfare, defined as the use of 
non-state para-military groups by countries either as a supplementary means of waging war or as 
a substitute for the overt use of force against an adversary, can be conducted under the criteria of 
covert operations, being carried out by states either as a means of coercing an adversary, 
disrupting the latter militarily, or indeed for a transformative objective such as regime change in, 
the promotion of separatism within, or the annexation of territory from the state subjected to 
attack by proxy.4 As Andrew Rathmell observes, covert operations and proxy warfare have been 
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characteristics of Middle Eastern politics since the mid-20th century, with Arab regimes using 
subversion and clandestine support for terrorism and insurgency in their own internecine 
struggles.5 Yet external powers have also used similar means to pursue their own regional 
interests; prime examples of such British activity include the UK Secret Intelligence Service’s 
(SIS) involvement alongside the CIA in the successful coup against Mohamed Mossadeq in Iran 
(August 1953) and a failed one in Syria (November 1956), and Britain’s clandestine backing for 
Royalist rebels fighting the Egyptian-backed Republican regime in Yemen between 1962 and 
1967.6 As was the case with British and Omani covert operations against the PDRY, two or more 
states can collaborate in proxy warfare against a common enemy, although in these cases the 
sponsor states can have differing political objectives for doing so.  
 
Using material from British archival sources, this article seeks to describe the origins and 
the scope of the Mahra raids into the PDRY in the latter phases of the Dhofar war (which were 
given the codename Operation Dhib by the British), examining in particular the reasons why the 
UK and Oman sought to employ these tribesmen as proxies. It is not intended to provide a 
comprehensive account of the Dhofar war, but to highlight an aspect of this conflict which has 
hitherto received very little academic study. The declassified evidence in the UK National 
Archives does not provide the basis for a complete account of Operation Dhib, yet there is 
sufficient archival material to outline when the British and Omani governments raised the Mahra 
tribal militias (known collectively as the ‘firqat’, with each individual formation a ‘firqa’) for 
cross-border incursions, what the objectives for proxy warfare were, and what challenges British 
civilian and military officials faced in managing this covert operation.  
 
 
 
 
 3 
The Dhofar war and the UK’s strategic objectives: 
 
In April 1963 around 100 nationalist rebels commenced an insurgency in Dhofar, taking up arms 
against the reactionary Sultan, Said bin Taimur, who was a long-standing ally of the UK. The 
character of the insurgency changed after December 1967, after the British withdrawal from 
South Arabia and the emergence of a Marxist-Leninist regime in Aden. Provided with sanctuary, 
funds, training, and arms by the South Yemenis, the PFLO insurgency grew rapidly in size and 
scale, and gradually drove the small and poorly-equipped Sultan’s Armed Forces (SAF) into the 
coastal plain of Dhofar, threatening the provincial capital of Salalah by the summer of 1970. On 
23 July that year Said was overthrown in a palace coup by his son, Qaboos, who was discreetly 
backed by British military officers assigned by the UK government on loan service with the SAF. 
Over the following five years, a progressively expanded SAF fought to wrest control of Dhofar 
away from the PFLO, aided by loan service officers, military supplies and a contingent of the 22nd 
Special Air Service Regiment (22SAS) sent from the UK, known as the ‘British Advisory 
Training Team’ (BATT). Oman also received significant military and financial assistance from 
other Gulf states, most notably an Imperial Iranian expeditionary force which was sent to the 
Sultanate in December 1973. By December 1975 the remnants of the PFLO had been driven 
across the border into the PDRY, although some insurgent elements continued to fight in Dhofar 
into the late 1970s.7 
 
 For both the Labour (1964-1970, 1974-1979) and Conservative (1970-1974) governments 
in office during this period, the UK’s support for the Sultanate of Oman – and in particular the 
role of British military personnel both in directing the war against the PFLO and in combat 
operations with the SAF in Dhofar – was not to be disclosed to parliament or to the British or 
international media.8 Britain backed the royal regime fearing that an insurgent victory would 
destabilise Oman and other pro-Western states in the Arabian Gulf, threatening access to regional 
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oil supplies. Officials in Whitehall were particularly concerned that following the withdrawal of 
British forces from their bases in Bahrain and Sharjah, the newly-independent Gulf States of 
Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates were vulnerable to revolutionary movements 
similar to the PFLO.9 However, the parlous state of the British economy and the demands placed 
by the UK armed forces’ commitments (with NATO and the counter-terrorist campaign in 
Northern Ireland being MOD priorities, and also commitments requiring substantial numbers of 
troops) precluded overt military assistance to the Sultanate, and also imposed limits on the 
number of advisors and SAS soldiers Britain could contribute to the war effort. Ministers and 
officials in Whitehall were also continually wary of either a prolonged embroilment in the 
counter-insurgency campaign in Dhofar, or indeed an escalation of the war into a confrontation 
with the PDRY, and were also keen to withdraw even the limited number of British military 
personnel from Oman once this was politically acceptable to the indigenous government – not to 
mention the USA and regional allies such as Saudi Arabia. The UK government’s concerns over 
escalation became particularly evident when the SAF became embroiled in border clashes with 
South Yemeni forces in May 1972 and October 1975.10 
 
 Whilst the UK never had more than a few hundred troops in Oman during the Dhofar 
war, it had a disproportionate share of influence during the campaign because Britons occupied 
key decision-making positions within the Sultanate. The Commander of the Sultan’s Armed 
Forces (CSAF) was a British Army officer on secondment; a Brigadier prior to December 1972 
and henceforth a Major-General. Despite a policy of ‘Omanisation’ implemented in the early 
1970s, up until the war’s end the officer corps of the SAF consisted largely of loan service 
personnel from the Army, the Royal Navy (including Royal Marines), and the Royal Air Force.11 
Until Qaboos assumed the role for himself in May 1973, the post of Sultan’s Defence Secretary 
was filled by two British officers during this period, Brigadier Pat Waterfield and (after January 
1970) Colonel Hugh Oldman. The Omani Intelligence Service (OIS, known as the Oman 
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Research Department (ORD) after 1974) was also a creation of the SIS and also British military 
intelligence officers assigned to the SAF. Nonetheless, the Sultans were not passive actors and 
British ‘advice’ was not always heeded. One of the principal reasons why the UK government 
and British officials in Oman colluded in Said’s overthrow was his reluctance either to increase 
the size of the SAF or to conduct an effective counter-insurgency campaign against the PFLO that 
tempered repression with reforms. Qaboos himself has traditionally been regarded as more 
receptive to British influence than his father, yet he was ready to assert his own authority as 
Sultan and also frequently overruled the military guidance provided by CSAF, particularly after 
the ‘oil shock’ which followed the Yom Kippur War (October 1973) increased the size of his oil 
revenues.12 As noted below, there was a clear divergence between British and Omani policy 
arising from Qaboos’ anger over South Yemeni support for the PFLO, and his desire to confront 
the PDRY. 
 
 As far as covert activity is concerned, Rory Cormac states that support for the Yemeni 
royalists during the 1960s was co-ordinated in Whitehall via the Joint Action Group, which 
remained as a means of directing British clandestine paramilitary operations up until at least the 
Soviet-Afghan war of 1979-1989.13 In the case of the Mahra raids, the initiative came from 
British officers serving with the SAF and OIS/ORD, responding to Qaboos’ wishes, and the files 
contain no reference to the Joint Action Group. Command and control for cross-border operations 
appeared to have been provided by the CSAF and the brigade commander in Dhofar, reporting 
through the Chiefs of Staff (COS) in London. Ministerial authorisation for the raids was provided 
in late 1972, although the archival evidence suggests that the most consistent supporter of this 
exercise in proxy warfare was General (later Field Marshal) Sir Michael Carver, who served as 
Chief of the General Staff from April 1971 to October 1973, and was subsequently the overall 
commander of the British armed forces (the Chief of the Defence Staff) from October 1973 to 
October 1976.14 
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The origins of the Mahra operation: 
 
The Mahra tribal group inhabited the cross-border region between Saudi Arabia, Oman and the 
former PDRY, between the Najd, Dhofar and the Yemeni province of Al-Mahra.15 Following 
South Yemeni independence in December 1967 the lack of a clearly demarcated border 
contributed to clashes between the SAF and PDRY forces, and the bitter hostility between Muscat 
and Aden (arising principally from South Yemeni support to the PFLO insurgency) precluded a 
diplomatic resolution to the frontier dispute.16 
 
Whilst al-Mahra was formally part of the Eastern Aden Protectorate until December 
1967, up until 1963 before independence the tribes there had enjoyed considerable autonomy, and 
it was only in the final four years of their colonial presence that the British sought to extend their 
authority into the Mahra region.17 After the British withdrawal from South Arabia, al-Mahra 
became the 6th Governate of South Yemen, although its tribes became more restive as the new 
regime in Aden became progressively more Marxist-Leninist in both its ideology and policies. By 
October 1972 there were 75 Mahra exiles serving with the firqat forces, the Dhofari tribal militias 
established by Qaboos and trained by 22 SAS under the guise of the BATT. The 6th and 5th 
(Hadramaut) Governates of the PDRY together were the size of England, but the extent of 
government control over both were limited – British intelligence estimated that there were only 
1,000 South Yemeni troops to cover the two governates.18 The Eastern PDRY was therefore 
theoretically well-suited for proxy warfare because of its size, terrain and also the truculence of 
the local tribes. 
 
 The concept of using the Mahras as proxies originated in the summer of 1969, at a time 
when the war in Dhofar was going badly for the SAF. In early June the CSAF, Brigadier Corran 
Purdon, was informed by his intelligence officers that a deserter from the South Yemeni army had 
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contacted them with a request for arms, funds and a safe haven. The unnamed defector pledged in 
return to provide 50 Mahra volunteers to help start a tribal rebellion, which would capture forts 
under government control, attack the PFLO’s base in the border town of Hauf, and also cut the 
insurgency’s supply lines into South Yemen.19 Purdon was also attracted to the possibility that a 
Mahra revolt might create a sympathetic buffer state between Oman and the PDRY, although 
Said rejected this proxy warfare proposal for that very reason, fearing that Mahra separatism 
would lead to territorial claims against Oman, destabilising the Sultanate in the process.20 
Qaboos, however, would have no such qualms.  
 
 
Operation Dhib commences, October-November 1972: 
 
1972 proved to be the pivotal year for the Dhofar war, as while the PFLO still posed a serious 
military threat to the SAF’s control over the province, the latter began to undertake successful 
operations to contain the insurgency. In April 1972 Qaboos ordered the occupation of a defensive 
position at Sarfait, near the border, so as to cut the insurgency’s supply lines to the PDRY. 
However, this operation (known as Simba) tied a battalion of SAF troops in a static defensive 
position which had was vulnerable to artillery and mortar fire from across the frontier, and the 
garrison at Sarfait could do little to interdict the traffic of arms, supplies and reinforcements 
across the border. Sustaining Sarfait stretched the army and Sultan of Oman’s Air Force (SOAF) 
to its limits, but the position could not be abandoned because it would constitute a propaganda 
victory for the PFLO. Nonetheless, the insurgents also over-reached themselves with a failed 
attempt to seize the town and fortress of Mirbat in Eastern Dhofar (19 July 1972), experiencing a 
costly defeat in the process, and the PFLO’s efforts to build up a support network in Northern 
Oman were decisively disrupted by the OID and police with a series of arrests in December 1972. 
By the year’s end, the Sultan was reportedly frustrated at the stalemate in Dhofar, whilst both 
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Oldman and the two senior officers serving as CSAF (Brigadier John Graham and (after 
September 1972) Major-General Tim Creasey) were concerned that Qaboos would order further 
operations that were beyond the limited capabilities that his armed forces and his British backers 
could provide. On the other hand, the 6th Governate of South Yemen was experiencing increasing 
tribal unrest which, the British defence attaché in Muscat noted, ‘could grow to represent a major 
distraction for the PDRY forces thereby lessening their willingness and ability to help the 
[PFLO]’.21 
 
 On 8 October 1972 Qaboos sent a request to the British government, via the UK embassy 
in Muscat, for assistance in training a Mahra firqa for ‘unattributable (sic) small scale guerrilla 
operations in the 6th province of the PDRY’. The defence attaché, Colonel C. S. Welch, informed 
the COS that ‘[enquiries] across the border indicate that the people will welcome and support any 
force attempting to restore their sovereignty’.22 The Sultan requested an additional presence of 
SAS personnel, to supplement the BATT which was training the Dhofari militias, and in addition 
to this request through official channels an OIS officer also contacted the Brigadier John 
Simpson, the commander of the British Army’s special forces, to request SAS assistance.23 The 
proposal gained military approval, particularly after General Carver’s visit to Oman on 18 
October; his military assistant noted that cross-border raids by the Mahra could ‘bring dividends’, 
‘[winning] hearts and minds in the 6th Governate Area of the PDRY’. PFLO activities in South 
Yemen had been ‘entirely unmolested’, and paramilitary operations including sabotage, the 
mining of roads, and ambushes on PFLO and PDRY military convoys would disrupt the 
insurgents and their backers.24 In this respect, a possible additional motive for instigating covert 
operations was revenge against the South Yemeni regime, not only for its support for the PFLO, 
but also for the successful insurgency its precursor, the National Liberation Front, had waged 
against British rule in South Arabia from 1962 to 1967.  
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 Donald Hawley, the British ambassador to Oman, expressed his own concerns over a 
resort to proxy warfare. Whilst acknowledging that the Sultan’s request was backed by British 
military officers in the SAF and the MOD, he stated that whilst ‘[a] diversion in the sixth 
province might take some of the heat out of rebel operations in Dhofar … I have not been 
personally convinced that the game is worth the candle even from the Sultanate’s point of view’. 
Hawley pointed out that Britain still had diplomatic relations with the PDRY, and that there 
would be political consequences if the UK provided military support to the Mahra. If any British-
trained tribesmen were captured by South Yemeni security forces, the operation would no longer 
be ‘unattributable’, and Hawley also suspected that any programme of cross-border raids would 
be a prolonged one. Patrick Wright, the head of the Middle Eastern Department at the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office (FCO), cited additional risks, namely that waging a proxy war in 
South Yemen would ‘[divert] the Sultanate’s efforts and resources (which are already inadequate) 
from meeting the rebellion within Oman itself’, that Mahra separatism posed a potential threat to 
the integrity of the Sultanate, and that the cross-border operation could become public knowledge 
in the UK, which would in turn generate ‘undesirable publicity’ for 22SAS’s own role fighting 
alongside the firqat forces in Dhofar itself. Wright nonetheless argued that British support for 
covert action would help the UK restrain Qaboos’ desire for overt military retaliation against the 
PDRY, whilst the Mahra could be used as a bargaining counter to persuade Aden to stop backing 
the insurgents. He also noted that if ‘the operation goes ahead with or without SAS help, Britain 
will probably be accused of conniving at it’, and that ‘[we] may as well be hung for a sheep as a 
lamb, therefore; and try to make the operation as effective as possible.25 
 
 Ultimately, prevailing opinion within both the FCO and MOD stressed that despite the 
political risks involved in training the Mahra, the lack of British backing would enrage Qaboos, 
whose plans for covert action were supported by Saudi Arabia. The Saudis themselves – 
reportedly bent upon achieving regime change in Aden – would also blame the British for 
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appeasement in the face of South Yemen’s subversive intentions in the region. Officials in 
Whitehall recommended that assistance be offered provided that it was limited, and enabled the 
UK to disavow any responsibility if any raiding parties were eliminated or captured by the South 
Yemenis. Six soldiers from 22SAS would be involved in training the Mahra, under the cover 
already provided by the BATT – the Mahra themselves could if necessary be passed off as a firqa 
raised for counter-insurgency operations in Oman itself.26 On 23 November 1972, the Cabinet’s 
Defence and Overseas Policy Committee authorised Operation Dhib, giving specific instructions 
that SAS troops were not to accompany the Mahra on their cross-border raids. The Prime 
Minister, Edward Heath, also stipulated that their authorisation was valid for six months, after 
which the COS would have to request renewed approval, and that ‘any breach of security could 
lead to an immediate withdrawal of the SAS team and a [disavowal] of SAS involvement’.27 This 
caveat meant that unlike the Claret cross-border raids conducted during the confrontation with 
Indonesia over Borneo (1963-1966), British military personnel would not become involved in 
combat operations in South Yemen itself. Indeed, BATT soldiers were barred from operating 
within 25 kilometres (16 miles) of the border.28 
 
 Operation Dhib was therefore principally instigated as a concession to Qaboos, and in the 
hope that the employment of the Mahra as proxies would help the UK withstand the Sultan’s 
demands for direct military intervention against South Yemen. In this respect, the use of special 
forces personnel to train them was as much a means of controlling these guerrillas as of 
enhancing their effectiveness in covert warfare. In fact, the Mahra project not only failed to 
address the Omani monarch’s inclinations towards escalation, but it also encouraged him to 
demand an expansion of cross-border operations in the process.29 
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The expansion of Operation Dhib, 1973: 
 
From the British perspective, the main Mahra formation was the Firqa al-Baadiya which had 
been established in the autumn of 1971 to patrol the border between Dhofar and the PDRY. 
Following the Heath government’s decision to support limited cross-border raids, this firqa had 
had an SAS training team assigned to it in January 1973, and it became based at Shisr, 70 miles 
from the Yemeni frontier. This force consisted of around 100 fighters, and was judged by Colonel 
Welch to be ‘probably incapable of more than the odd nuisance raid or skirmish, albeit deep in 
PDRY territory’. There were at least two other Mahra groups active at this time; the Jaish al-
Asifat, which was recruited with Saudi funding for raids into the 4th and 5th Governates of South 
Yemen, and an unnamed unit of 250 Mahra tribesmen, which Qaboos established without 
consulting the British government.30  
 
Detailed information on the scope of the Mahra operations is scant, particularly for the 
Jaish al-Asifat, which had no British direction or training. There is also no information on the 
specifics of the training programmes, or details about how the Mahra were armed and trained, 
although it is reasonable to presume that advice on ambush tactics and setting mines was 
provided, and the weapons supplied were presumably not British in origin.31 What we now know 
is that the cross-border incursions appear to have been sporadic in frequency, involving 30 
fighters at the most with each incursion, and the attacks on PDRY targets were small in scale. A 
raid on a South Yemeni military convoy in May 1973 reportedly destroyed seven trucks, with the 
Mahra killing 22 enemy soldiers and capturing one.32 
 
 On 2 May 1973 Qaboos, evidently dissatisfied with the limited number of cross-border 
operations, ordered Creasey to establish the Southern Mahra firqa. The CSAF noted that due to 
tribal feuds between the latter and the Northern clansmen serving with the Firqat al-Baadiya, this 
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new formation could not be based at Shisr, and a second SAS team would be required to train it. 
Hawley reported that the Governor of Dhofar Province, Buraik bin Hamud al-Ghafiri, sided with 
the Southern Mahra and advocated the creation of a separate firqa for them; Buraik had a 
considerable amount of influence over Qaboos because he had played a key role in instigating the 
coup of July 1970. The ambassador, however, regarded the Southern Mahra as ‘unimpressive’, 
and Creasey also ‘urged [the Sultan] not to let the politically grasping but militarily ineffectives 
of (sic) the South sour and adversely affect the Northerners who are presently doing so well’.33 In 
Whitehall, there were concerns within the FCO over the impact of extended cross-border activity, 
and also the threat of reprisal attacks by the PFLO against SAS personnel in Dhofar. The COS 
also noted that the Mahra tribes may have been infiltrated by South Yemeni intelligence, as there 
had been ‘a small number of low-grade defections from the Mahra Firqat and subsequent 
reference to their operations on Aden Radio’, although these broadcasts had ‘not attracted any 
adverse publicity elsewhere’. The British military chiefs also dismissed the likelihood that 
expanded operations would increase the already considerable risk to the 22SAS contingent in 
Dhofar, and also argued that Mahra operations provided an ‘additional and useful source of 
intelligence’ on PDRY military capabilities for the MOD’s Defence Intelligence Service.34  
 
Creasey received ministerial authorisation to train the Southern Mahra on 1 June 1973, 
although contrary to his initial recommendations the British government refused to deploy a 
second SAS team, directing CSAF that all training for cross-border incursions should take place 
at the Firqa al-Baadiya’s base at Shisr regardless of tribal tensions. The Southern Mahra were 
also confined to patrolling and internal security operations in Dhofar until Operation Dhib’s 
subsequent ministerial review, in January 1974.35 In fact, their firqa was never deployed on 
guerrilla operations in South Yemen. 
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Controlling the Mahra, 1974-1975: 
 
During the course of 1974 the military situation in Dhofar changed decisively in the Sultanate’s 
favour, not least because Shah Reza Pahlavi of Iran sent a brigade of troops backed by a strong 
air force contingent to reinforce the SAF. In March 1974 Labour regained office following the 
British general election, and although Harold Wilson’s government was as committed to 
supporting the Omani monarchy as Heath’s had been, both he and his Defence Secretary, Roy 
Mason, expressed the same caveats about escalation and over-commitment of scant UK military 
resources as their Conservative predecessors. This was augmented in Labour’s case by the 
hostility that its left-wing MPs and party members felt towards overseas interventions, 
demonstrated by the condemnation that some backbenchers offered towards British policy in 
Oman.36  
 
Thanks mainly to Iranian military support, the SAF was eventually able to drive the bulk 
of the PFLO out of Dhofar by December 1975, although during this phase of the war the potential 
for an all-out confrontation with the PDRY became more pronounced. This scenario was an issue 
of considerable concern for the British because the South Yemeni armed forces were well-
equipped for conventional warfare (its inventory included Soviet-supplied fighter jets and 
bombers) in comparison with the SAF. Creasey noted in August 1974 that Aden had bolstered its 
military and security force presence in the 5th and 6th Governates, due to ‘our trans border 
operations, our frontier positions, and the Iranian presence in Dhofar’, and by the end of the year 
there were about 3,000 South Yemeni troops facing the Omani frontier. By this point, South 
Yemeni militiamen had infiltrated Oman in order to bolster the PFLO, and in October 1975 there 
were a series of border clashes, culminating with SAF artillery and SOAF air-strikes on Hauf.37  
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 The Firqa al-Baadiya was regarded as an effective proxy by the British, particularly for 
the intelligence it gathered on South Yemeni military capabilities, although following an 
incursion in the autumn of 1973 Creasey ordered a pause in their operations on 20 October. As 
one senior MOD official noted, this raid ‘produced a strong PDRY reaction and measures by 
them against local tribesmen suspected of assisting the [Firqa al-Baadyia]. As a result CSAF has 
temporarily stopped cross-border action by that Firqat until the dust settles’. Carver also 
suspected that the Northern Mahra raids could have provoked a South Yemeni air strike on 
Makinat Shihan, an outpost on the border occupied by the SAF and Dhofari militiamen, on 18 
November. Nonetheless, incursions into South Yemen resumed in March 1974, and over the next 
six months the Firqa al-Baadiya carried out three incursions, killing at least 20 enemy personnel. 
Even in this case, as one of Creasey’s staff noted, this force was directed to ‘restrict [its] 
operations to low scale guerrilla type raids, and reconnaissance patrols’, and it was ‘forbidden to 
engage PDRY regular forces in full scale battle’, in order to ‘reduce the risk of retaliation [against 
Oman], and to keep to the minimum repressive measures by PDRY against the Mahra tribe’.38 
The CSAF was therefore not only concerned about provoking a wider confrontation with South 
Yemen, but also showed an awareness that a cycle of rebellion and security force retaliation in 
the Mahra territory could lead to a civil war within South Yemen, which in turn would increase 
the likelihood of hostilities between Oman and the PDRY.  
 
 The fate of the Southern Mahra firqa is less easy to determine. Although ministerial 
authorisation for training this formation was provided in June 1973, from official correspondence 
it appears that contrary to British wishes it was not co-located with the Firqa al-Baadiya, 
presumably because of the inter-tribal tensions between the Northern and Southern Mahra noted 
above. The declassified evidence does not indicate what position Qaboos himself took, although 
as the Chief of the Defence Staff noted the Sultan ‘attaches great importance to the Southern 
Mahra’ firqa, and may well have withstood British requests to send them to Shisr for training. 
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This formation was directed by Creasey to ‘operate initially inside Oman’, but the CSAF reported 
‘that this has been ineffective because of its inadequate training, control and tasking’. One MOD 
official noted that if the Southern Mahra were used on cross-border raids in their current 
condition ‘their operations could prove an embarrassment’. In early January 1974 Creasey 
therefore repeated the Sultan’s request for a second 22SAS team to support this formation. This 
request received the support of the COS and MOD, and with ministerial approval special forces 
personnel were attached to the Southern Mahra for the next five months.39 
 
 This extension of Operation Dhib proved, however, to be short-lived. Whilst the British 
envisaged cross-border raids as a means of satisfying Qaboos’ urge for wider retaliation against 
South Yemen, the Southern Mahra were separatists bent upon establishing an independent state, 
and their relationship with the Governor of Dhofar undermined the efforts of British military 
officials to control them. There was therefore, as one MOD official observed, ‘a decline of 
discipline and a measure of challenge to effective command by CSAF’, and faced with the 
possibility that the Southern Mahra firqa would go rogue Creasey ordered the withdrawal of the 
SAS contingent assigned to it, ceasing training for cross-border incursions and confining this 
formation to counter-insurgency operations in Dhofar alongside locally-raised militias. Given that 
the British were anxious to avoid a prolonged engagement in Oman, and due to their limited 
aspirations for the Mahra proxies, the demise of this firqa was probably welcomed by officials in 
London and Muscat.40  
 
 In contrast, the Firqa al-Baadiya remained operational at least until January 1975, when 
Carver again requested the Defence Secretary’s approval for the continuation both of Operation 
Dhib, and the SAS training mission for the Northern Mahra. Declassified UK government files do 
not disclose whether further ministerial authorisation was forthcoming, or exactly when the cross-
border raids ceased. What is evident is that both Creasey and his superiors in the COS believed 
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that the 22SAS training teams not only prepared the Mahra for incursions into South Yemen, but 
also restricted their scope in accordance with CSAF’s intentions and UK government policy. As 
one British officer attached to SAF headquarters noted, the SAS soldiers involved ‘have played 
an invaluable, if unspectacular, role under very difficult and trying conditions both of climatic 
(sic) and those endemic to dealing with the Mahra tribesmen’, and had enabled the British to 
counter both Sultan Qaboos’ more ambitious intention to destabilise the PDRY and their Mahra 
proxies’ dream of independence from Aden. As such, British special forces ‘have played a vital 
role in preventing these operations from escalating into full scale fighting, from which Oman and 
SAF, would tend to lose more than they gain’.41 Operation Dhib therefore ran contrary to other 
documented cases of covert action and proxy warfare, as the UK’s main purpose in supporting the 
Mahra’s cross-border raids was to influence the policy of an ally (the Omani monarchy) rather 
than an adversary (the PDRY).  
 
 
Conclusions: 
 
Due to the limitations of the documentary evidence there are certain questions which this article 
cannot address, one of which is the extent to which the Mahra raiding parties were supported by 
their tribal counterparts in South Yemen. The second involves the history of the Saudi-backed 
Jaish al-Asifat, the Saudi-sponsored firqa which operated without British oversight. The third 
concerns the exact end of the Mahra operation, although there is fragmentary evidence to suggest 
Saudi Arabia was instigating tribal subversion in the PDRY during the early 1980s; such activity 
(if indeed it was conducted) was possibly a legacy of Operation Dhib. In the aftermath of the 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (25-27 December 1979) the British did consider renewed 
covert action against the PDRY, although at least one senior FCO diplomat expressed his 
opposition, describing South Yemen as ‘a country of venal [and] untrustworthy intriguers’, and 
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asserting that any attempt to influence local proxies there was ‘a lottery’. Whilst British 
assistance to the Afghan mujahidin is a matter of historical record, we do not know if this 
proposal to instigate revolt in the PDRY had any concrete results. Indeed, given South Yemen’s 
volatility during the 1980s  it is doubtful as to whether significant external covert action was 
required to destabilise it.42 
 
 What declassified British government files do demonstrate is that the UK’s role in 
waging proxy warfare against South Yemen during the early 1970s does not conform to 
established theories about why states conduct covert paramilitary operations. Sultan Qaboos 
appears to have intended to use the Mahra in a coercive role, responding to the PDRY’s own 
support for the insurgency in Dhofar, whilst the Saudis (at least according to British officials) 
wanted to overthrow the Marxist-Leninist regime in Aden. In contrast, whilst there was a hope 
that the Mahra could disrupt the PFLO with its cross-border attacks, Operation Dhib was 
primarily viewed both by the UK government, and British officers attached to the Omani armed 
forces, as a means of curbing Qaboos’ demands for punitive action which could lead to a war 
between South Yemen and Oman. Such a scenario would in turn either oblige Britain to commit 
itself further to its ally’s defence – placing a potentially intolerable burden on its over-stretched 
armed forces – or would lead to an embarrassing decision to abandon the Sultanate to its fate, 
which would have been a damaging blow both for Western interests and the UK’s residual 
influence in the region. British officials were also aware that Saudi Arabia was a rival for 
influence in Oman, and that Saudi officials were telling Qaboos that the UK would prove to be an 
unreliable ally. The Mahra cross-border raids were therefore a means primarily of addressing the 
Omani monarch’s wishes and of forestalling any policy decisions by him that could turn the 
counter-insurgency campaign in Dhofar into an inter-state confrontation between the Sultanate 
and the PDRY. They were also intended to demonstrate to Qaboos that the British were 
dependable partners, even if the scope of their regional influence had declined since the 
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withdrawal from their military bases in South Arabia (December 1967) and the Arabian Gulf 
(December 1971).43 
 
In this respect, the scope of Operation Dhib was limited, and both ministers and officials 
in Whitehall and the CSAF exercised the same tight control over the Mahra as their counterparts 
had done with covert aid to the royal rebellion in Yemen during the 1960s. Scholars of covert 
action and proxy warfare observe that paramilitary activity can lead to uncontrolled escalation, 
either because the proxy forces concerned are unsuccessful (which obliges sponsoring states to 
provide more aid, and possibly personnel, to prevent their defeat) or paradoxically because they 
are too successful (at which point the target state either collapses or retaliates against the 
sponsors). Furthermore, the provision of aid to a proxy does not necessarily mean that a sponsor 
can exercise political control or strategic direction.44 Whilst senior British military officers – 
notably Carver and Creasey – offered the most persistent support for Dhib, there was a common 
recognition that cross-border operations should be limited in number and restricted in scale. In 
addition, the brief engagement with and abandonment of the Southern Mahra firqa (January-June 
1974) showed that the British would not permit or facilitate incursions into the PDRY by a proxy 
formation that they could not command and control. The Firqa al-Baadiya received SAS 
assistance from November 1972 to at least January 1975 because whilst its guerrillas fought for a 
separate Mahra state, their activities could be directed and managed by the British, as 
demonstrated by the pause in their operations that Creasey ordered in October 1973. 
 
Above all, with Operation Dhib the British avoided the same strategic mistake that, to 
take two analogous examples, the Americans experienced during the Vietnam War (1961-1973) 
and the South Africans in Namibia (1961-1990). There is a temptation for states involved in 
fighting insurgencies to view retaliation against the latter’s external backers as a decisive means 
of crippling an adversary and winning an internal war. So in this regard the USA backed the 
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Hmong in Laos (1961-1973) in the hope that the latter would cut the Ho Chi Minh trail linking 
North Vietnam with the Viet Cong in the South, whilst South Africa armed and assisted UNITA 
in Angola because it saw the MPLA regime as a critical source of support both for the African 
National Congress and the Namibian national liberation movement, SWAPO.45 In contrast, 
British ministers, diplomats and senior military officers did not presume that the cessation of 
South Yemeni support would critically weaken the PFLO itself. Operation Dhib did not become a 
priority over SAF operations and the political effort to legitimise Sultan Qaboos’ regime, because 
there was a collective understanding in London and Muscat that the war against the PFLO 
insurgency could only be fought and won in Dhofar itself.  
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